

Histories and Spaces of Terrorism in Africa: The Post-9/11 Strategic Challenge of Somalia's al Shabab

Ruan van der Walt and
Hussein Solomon¹

Abstract

Despite terrorism's long history, there is still today no consistent or widely agreed upon definition of either what constitutes terrorism or who the terrorist is. Africa's strategic significance in the "war on terrorism" grew post-9/11 along with acceptance of the idea that weak and failing states pose a threat to international security by providing an ideal environment for terrorism, and in particular, for the rise of radical Islam.. Somalia is often cited as the paradigm of a weak state, and the post-9/11 counterterrorism discourses propose that the promotion of democracy and good governance will provide the most effective strategy to counter Somalia's al Shabab. This article aims to discuss the post-9/11 strategic challenge of Somalia's al Shabab in the context of histories and spaces of terror in Africa.

Keywords: *Africa, al Shabab, post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, radical Islam, Somalia, terrorism, weak states.*

Introduction

Terrorism is simultaneously as old as human civilisation and as new as this morning's headlines, with some insisting that individuals and organisations have been using terror tactics for millennia, while others arguing that real terrorism has only been around for decades (Law, 2009:

¹ Both authors are attached to the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. E-mail: solomonh@ufs.ac.za.

1). The term *terrorism* is commonly used, but lacks a clear, consistent and widely agreed upon definition of either what constitutes terrorism or *who* the terrorist is. Academics, politicians, security experts and journalists have employed a variety of definitions of terrorism throughout history, changing the meaning and usage of the word over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era.

With international attention focussed on the Middle East in the “war on terrorism”, it is easy to forget that al Qaeda’s most audacious terrorist attacks prior to the September 11 2001 attacks in the US were the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, which cost the lives of 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injuring 4,574 more (Mills, 2004). Africa’s strategic significance in the “war on terrorism” was raised post-9/11, with then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Clinton Administration, Susan Rice (2001), describing Africa as the world’s “soft underbelly for global terrorism”. Likewise, the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* also changed the calculus of Africa’s strategic significance by officially stating for the first time that “weak states...can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states” (*National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002).

Somalia is often cited as the paradigm of a weak state, where decades of civil war resulted in state collapse and weak institutions, providing the ideal environment for terrorism, and especially the rise of radical Islam. Although some Sufi Islamic orders were actively involved in anti-colonial resistance, the emergence of a modern political Islamic consciousness began to gather momentum in the 1960s. Even though al Shabab, which broke away from the Islamic Courts Union, was not active and did not control any territory until 2007-2008, the primary objective of this group was irredentism and the establishment of the “Greater Somalia” under Shari’a Law. Civil war and state collapse have rendered Somalia especially vulnerable to external influences, some which have helped radical groups, such as al Shabab, to flourish, often part of a broader international network.

The post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies proposed for weak and failing states argue that the promotion of democracy and good governance will result in increasing the legitimacy of the ruling power to exercise con-

trol over its territory and population by means of regular, multiparty elections, and by providing a conducive setting for socio-economic reforms (i.e. the alleviation of extreme poverty). Such developments, it is suggested, will in turn allow for the building of state capacity and institutions aimed at combating terrorism, through the training and rebuilding of the security forces – so-called security sector reform.

It is the explicit aim of this paper to discuss the post-9/11 strategic challenge of Somalia's al Shabab in the context of histories and spaces of terror in Africa. The occurrence and practice of terrorism as a historical phenomenon, both globally and in the African context is analysed. In addition, the nature of modern conceptions of the practice, and post-9/11 policy responses to combat this "new" form of terrorism in weak states is also examined. The study is executed in an historical-descriptive and analytical manner, based on a comprehensive literature study.

Historical Overview

The term *terrorism* is one of those few words, like the Internet, that have insidiously worked their way into our everyday parlance, and yet today there is no clear, consistent and widely agreed upon definition of either what constitutes terrorism or *who* the terrorist is (Smith, 2010: 3). It is the purpose of this section to contextualise terrorism as a global phenomenon historically, and in particular, within the African context.

Modern definitions of an old concept

Terrorism, as a phenomenon, is gradually becoming a pervasive, often dominant influence in our daily lives. It affects the manner in which governments conduct their foreign policies; the way corporations transact business; it causes alterations in the structure of our security forces; and forces us to spend huge amounts of time and money to protect public figures, vital installations, citizens and even our systems of government (Combs, 2006: 8-10). But what is terrorism? Academics, politicians, security experts and journalists have employed a variety of definitions of terrorism throughout history, changing the meaning and usage of the word over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era (Whittaker, 2012: 6-7).

Examples of terrorism can be traced all the way back to the ancient world, where the Assyrians – perhaps the ancient world’s fiercest and most violent people – conquered others with material assets and large populations through large military formations of chariots and cavalry, subsequently ruling their remote and diverse empire in the ninth to seventh centuries BCE through systematic terror (Law, 2009: 11-12). The Greek historian Xenophon (c. 431 – c. 350 BCE) was the first person to write of the effectiveness of psychological warfare against enemy populations (Katona, 2006: 15). More organised terrorist history dates back to the times of the Sacarii of Judea and the Zealots, both Jewish terrorist groups active during the first century Roman occupation of the Middle East. The Sacarii obtained their name from their favoured weapon, the *sica* (short dagger) used to murder those they deemed traitors. The Zealots, on the other hand, targeted Romans and Greeks, and just like the terrorists of today usually seek media attention, the Zealots killed in broad daylight in front of witnesses, sending a clear message to the Roman occupiers and the Jews who collaborated with them (Katona, 2006: 16-17).

Political terror and the theory and practice of righteous killing figured prominently in both the Islamic world and Christian Europe during the centuries between the collapse of Roman rule in the West and the dawning of the modern era (Law, 2009: 32). Terrorism perpetrated by groups became more common during the Middle Ages, with widespread assassinations by the “Brotherhood of Assassins” - the sectarian group of Muslims in Jerusalem who were employed by their spiritual and political leader, Hassan I Sabah, to spread terror in the form of murder and destruction among religious enemies (Combs, 2006: 22-23). Tyrannicide – the assassination of a (tyrant) political leader – was fairly widely practiced throughout Italy during the Reformation, while it was also at least advocated in Spain and France during the Age of Absolutism (Combs, 2006: 24-25). Juan de Mariana, a Spanish Jesuit scholar and the leading advocate of the doctrine of tyrannicide, stated that “if in no other way it is possible to save the fatherland, the prince should be killed by the sword as a public enemy” (Quoted in Hurwood, 1970: 29), asserting that people possessed not only the right of rebellion but also the remedy of assassination.

Although there is no clear, consistent and widely accepted definition of what modern terrorism entails, it is at least clear that consensus has been reached by many authors and theorists about the origin of our modern conception of terrorism. The decisive move away from tyrannicide toward terrorism in its modern guise dates back to the French Revolution, with the Reign of Terror (*la Grande Terreur*) associated with key public figures, such as Maximilien Robespierre, through the centralised revolutionary dictatorship constructed by the Jacobins between 1792 and 1794 (Law, 2009; Combs, 2006; Whittaker, 2012; Smith, 2010; Katona, 2006; Lutz and Lutz, 2004). Robespierre (1794) considered terrorism as a vital tactic if the new French Republic was to survive its infancy, proclaiming that “terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs.”

The modern definition of terrorism has largely been influenced by four modern waves of terrorism, as identified by the author David Rapoport. Rapoport (2002) promulgates that modern terrorism began in Russia in the 1880s and spilled over to Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia within a decade. The “Anarchist wave” was the first global or truly international terrorist experience in history. Lasting some 40 years, it was characterised by assassination campaigns against prominent officials. The waves that followed were the “Anticolonial wave,” beginning in the 1920s and lasting about 40 years, and the “New Left wave,” which was greatly diminished by the end of the 20th century, though a few groups remain active today in Nepal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Peru and Colombia. The fourth wave is identified as a “Religious wave” and if the pattern of the previous three waves remains true the new wave should fade by the year 2025.

Histories and spaces of terrorism in Africa

With international attention focused on the Middle East in the “war on terrorism”, it is easy to forget that al Qaeda’s most audacious terrorist attacks prior to the September 11 2001 attacks in the US were the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, which cost the lives of 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injured 4,574

more (Mills, 2004). Before these events, discourses on terrorism in Africa often focused on the June 1995 event in Ethiopia, where some members of an Islamic Brotherhood allegedly planned to assassinate the then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa (Ayinde, 2010: 55). Other examples of the history of terrorism in Africa may also include events in Cairo, Morocco and other parts of North Africa, where Islamist militias operating under the name al Qaeda have targeted hotels, resorts and other places where Western interests may be found. We only need to think of tyrannical leaders such as Idi Amin from Uganda and Charles Taylor from Liberia to realise that terrorism has also been a tactic employed by African states, guerrilla armies and warlords for decades during wars predating and unconnected to the larger contemporary global terrorist threat (Mills, 2004: 157).

Oladosu Ayinde (2010: 56-61) offers an alternative genealogy of terrorism in African history and proposes three different phases of terrorism development on the continent. The first phase may be termed the Afro-Oriental phase, where “external” terror was occasioned by the invasion of Arabs into sub-Saharan Africa in search for slaves, and “internal” terror simultaneously arising from the threat of cannibalism. The appearance and active involvement of Europeans in the enslavement of Africans marked the beginning of the Afro-Occidental phase of African terrorism. Slavery remained the greatest act of terror during this phase, and although the physical torture and death suffered by the black African during this period are now outlawed globally, the psychological implications continue to this day in the sense that people bear the scars and are permanently pained each time they think of their forebears’ experiences – the lasting psychological effects of terrorism. The end of slavery marked the advent of the Afro-global phase of terrorism in Africa. It is argued that since power gained by force of arms is often sustained through the same means, the British in Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt and other parts of Africa had no option but to resort to violence and terror in order to maintain the empire. The 130 year-history of French colonial rule in Algeria during this period is of particular importance for the abhorrent nature of the terrorism tactics employed to coerce Algerians into submission.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's attempts to secure a foothold in Africa resulted in the US lavishing attention and resources on the continent, forming "special relationships" with geostrategically important states, such as South Africa and Congo-Kinshasa (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)), to counter communist expansion (Pham, 2007). It is worth recalling that a two-day tour in 1957 across the continent by then vice president of the US, Richard Nixon, resulted in the creation of an African Bureau in the US Department of State. The end of the Cold War resulted in the collapse of patronage and state institutions in many African countries, such as Liberia, the DRC, Somalia and Sierra Leone. The massive influx of weapons and small arms from Eastern Europe during the 1990s fuelled the conflicts and with no central authority to govern the states, civil unrest broke out (Sheehan, 2008: 212). Ayinde (2010: 56) asserts that although these episodes of terrorist events are violent and abhorred for their inhumanity, they should not be treated in isolation from each other and that it should be recognised that the spaces of terror across Africa are far more elastic than generally imagined.

The uniqueness and persistence of the four waves of modern terrorism, along with the brief aforementioned historical contextualisation of global and African terrorism, indicates that terrorism is deeply rooted in modern cultures (Ayinde, 2010: 56). It is evident that definitions of terrorism are not fixed and that they change over time according to the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, and the cliché "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" provides little assistance in achieving definitional clarity.

Theoretical Orientation

Africa's strategic significance in the "war on terrorism" was raised post-9/11, with then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Clinton Administration, Susan Rice (November 2001), describing Africa as the world's "soft underbelly for global terrorism". Likewise, the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* also changed the calculus of Africa's strategic significance by identifying that "weak states...can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states."

The following section sets out to provide a modern working definition of terrorism based on the historical overview, followed by a discussion on the key aspects of the implications of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US on modern terrorism discourses, culminating in counterterrorist strategies proposed for weak states.

A modern working definition of terrorism

Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the concept, is fundamentally and inherently political in nature, a political term derived from state terror (Whittaker, 2012: 5). Discourses of and about terrorism have mainly been appropriated by Western powers and intellectuals and our understanding of the concept has been broadened or narrowed by these discourses (Ayinde, 2010: 51). While it has not yet been possible to create a universally acceptable definition of terrorism, it is at least necessary, and indeed possible, to identify certain common features prevalent in the various definitions.

A good starting point for a discussion on the commonalities of definitions would be to consider the modern definition of terrorism employed by the US (*Patterns of Global Terrorism*, May 2002), incorporated in Title 22 of the US Code, as the forerunner in the “war on terror”. Section 2656f(d) states that terrorism is defined as:

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Some scholarly definitions expound that:

Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change (Hoffman, quoted in Mahan and Griset, 2008: 4-5).

Terrorism is the use of terrorizing methods of governing or resisting a government (Ahmed, 1998).

Terrorism is the illegitimate use of covert violence by a group for political ends (Laqueur quoted in Mahan and Griset, 2008: 4-5).

The Organization of African Unity’s (now the African Union) *Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* (adopted July 14, 1999) defines terrorism very broadly:

Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to:

- (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or to abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
- (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
- (iii) create a general insurrection in a State.

At least four crucial components can be identified from the plethora of definitions of terrorism in existence today. The first component is that terrorism inextricably involves an act of violence, whether the violence is fully perpetrated or whether the threat of violence, where the capacity and the willingness to commit violence, are displayed (Combs, 2006: 11). Second, terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or targets of the terrorist attacks by instilling fear within, and thereby intimidating, a wider target audience (Whittaker, 2012: 11). The third component regarding the innocent victims is possibly the most ambiguous aspect of these definitions. The rules of war attribute certain personalities and subsequent protections or statuses to the various parties involved in the conflict situation, which is another dilemma attributing to the complexity and difficulty in establishing an encompassing definition of terrorism. The term “noncombatant,” for example, confronts scholars with definitional challenges, as it should not only cover civilians, but also members of armed forces not active in combat (Gupta, 2008: 6). The final crucial component of the various definitions is that terrorists will always possess political motives or goals (Lutz and Lutz, 2004: 10). Terrorism could even be considered as the “continuation of politics by other means” (Sick quoted in Lutz and Lutz, 2004: 10), where the “terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today” (Ahmed, 1998).

Be that as it may, as has been noted above, it is argued that terrorist acts are distinguished from similar war or crime activities in that they are usually committed deliberately upon innocent third parties in an effort to coerce the opposing party or persons into some desired political course of action, i.e. the “playing to an audience” aspect of terrorism (Combs, 2006: 12). As such, for the purposes of the remainder of this study, and based on the preceding discussion, the authors will ascribe to the US Department of State definition of modern terrorism in reflection of the fact that the US is the forerunner in the “war on terrorism”, and due to the fact that this definition contains all four crucial components of a modern definition of terrorism as discussed above.

Pre- and post-9/11: Old and new terrorism

Although terrorism, as evidenced by the historical overview of the paper, has long been regarded as a persistent element of political violence, the events of September 11 2001 and the corresponding communicative responses of the US made terrorism and a global “war on terrorism” the defining feature of the historical moment that we have come to know as “post-9/11” (Smith, 2010: 6). Several things about the 9/11 attacks were novel: first, the scale of the event; second, the event claimed the lives of a large number of victims; and third, the event was experienced globally in real time through the modern media. In the period immediately following the 9/11 attacks, US policy makers endeavoured to convey the impression that the threat they were dealing with was unprecedented in human history and that nothing could be learned from previous experience. Critics, however, of the *new* terrorism argue that historical precedents can be found for all developments that have been identified as new and that, therefore, the concept as a whole is flawed (Neumann, 2009: 11-12).

The critical terrorism scholar, Richard Jackson (2005), suggests that the “war on terrorism” is both a set of institutional practices (military and intelligence operations, diplomatic initiatives, special government departments and security bodies, standard operating procedures and specific legislation), as well as an accompanying discursive project. The new terrorism discourse constructed and reaffirmed new identities for the victims – innocent, heroic and good Americans – and the terrorists – evil, barbarous and inhuman. In this meta-narrative, the “war” is fought between transnational,

de-territorialised terrorists and the US, a symbolic remake of the eternal struggle between the forces of “civilisation” and “barbarism” (Jackson, 2005: 151-152). The “war on terror” is essentially a “war” to protect the civilized values of the West against the evil of the Rest, also conceptualised as the West against Islam (Ahmed, 1998). States are classified as either a market state of consent – one in which all persons can exercise the rights of conscience and in the politics of which the individual conscience plays the decisive role by means of a constitutional, consensual system of laws - or a rogue state of terror, where states “are either with us, or against us”. Philip Bobbit (2008: 525) further suggests that the emergence of modern market states is responsible for creating the conditions for twenty-first century terrorism by providing the model for global, networked and out-sourced terrorism, enabling the commodification of weapons of mass destruction (Bobbit, 2006: 220).

Prior to 9/11, most acts of terrorism depended on conventional explosives and, at their most deadly, managed to cause casualties in the low hundreds. A final development of the *new* terrorism is that there is a widespread sense in the West of the inevitability of further major terrorist attacks on the scale of 9/11, and many analysts believe that terrorists will inevitably acquire and use weapons of mass destruction such as biological pathogens or even nuclear arms – a phenomenon termed superterrorism (Freedman, 2002: 1). John Gearson (2002: 22) argues that the distinction between old and new terrorism was perhaps exaggerated following the events of 9/11, by stating that the capacity of global reach terrorism to cause thousands of casualties had been proven, but that the inevitability of the use of non-conventional weapons had not, and concludes that traditional terrorism (as discussed previously) is likely to remain the weapon of choice for most modern terrorists.

Weak states and counterterrorism strategies

A weak state may be defined as “a state that lacks the capacity for effective action across a range of state functions” (Heywood, 2007: 105), “a situation in which the legitimate power of the state (administrative structure) has disintegrated and can no longer exercise its authority over the whole or parts of the territory and population” (McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel, 2010: 409). The September 2002 *National Security Strategy of*

the United States of America emphasises that: “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders”. Unfortunately, this analysis is possibly nowhere truer than in Africa, where poverty and weak states have historically been endemic.

It has been estimated that one-third of sub-Saharan African states were afflicted by low state capacities by the 1990s, at least temporarily exacerbated by the process of globalisation with its open and transparent approach to governance issues, challenging the client-oriented and autocratic nature of many African economies. Greg Mills (2004: 160-161) argues that there is no exact correlation between complete state failure and terrorist activity, as terrorists ironically require key governance and infrastructure attributes (such as regular flights and reliable communications and banking systems) to operate effectively. Yet, a large number of weak states or quasi-states, porous borders, widespread poverty, political frustration, religious radicalism and repression on the African continent combine to create an environment in which the kind of alienation and radicalism that can foster both domestic and international terrorism thrives.

To rid the continent of the kinds of conditions mentioned above that foster the social alienation and radicalism that spawns terrorism in the long term, the twin foreign policy goals of the US in the “war on terrorism” propose that democracy and civil society must be promoted in Africa as a chief policy response and counterterrorism strategy (Whitaker, 2008: 254). US policy makers argue that they are two sides of the same coin and that there is no inconsistency in pursuing them simultaneously. Although a democracy can take a wide variety of forms, it is usually characterised as a form of rule that balances the principle of limited government against the ideal of popular consent, characterised by a constitutional government, guarantees of civil liberties and individual rights, institutionalised fragmentation, regular elections, party competition and political pluralism, the independence of organised and interest groups from government and a private-enterprise economy (Heywood, 2007: 30). Free and fair, regular multiparty elections could result in the legitimisation of the ruling power, which in turn could result in the legitimate power regaining the exercise of control or authority over its territory and population. Greater account-

ability, democracy, participation and transparency expressed by the concept of good governance in turn provide conducive settings for socioeconomic reforms (Shaw, 2008: 133). Socioeconomic reform programmes have been identified to be the best antidote against terrorism (Wilkinson, 2001: 67). The post-9/11 reconceptualising of the nexus between development and security resulted in the blurring of lines between civilian and military, and humanitarian aid and workers and intelligence, security and other military personnel who became part of the operational delivery of aid on the continent (Smith, 2010: 22). The development-security merger is enshrined in the following statement contained in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*:

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.

Greg Mills (2004: 165) also points out that a truly effective campaign against the domestic sources of terrorism in Africa requires enhancing the ability of African states to wield authoritative force through rebuilding and training police forces and the militaries. It is therefore believed that the promotion of democracy and good governance will result in increasing the legitimacy of the ruling power to exercise control over its territory and population by means of regular, multiparty elections, providing the conducive setting for socioeconomic reforms (i.e. the alleviation of extreme poverty), which in turn will result in the building of state capacity and institutions (aimed at combating terrorism) through the training and rebuilding of the security forces to wield authoritative force.

Case Study: The Post-9/11 Strategic Challenge of Somalia's Al Shabab

Somalia is often cited as the paradigm of a weak state (Walls, 2009: 371). Somalia, the number-seven-shaped country that forms the Horn of Africa in the north-east of the continent, has long been a contested concept, even amongst Somalis, embodying one of postcolonial Africa's worst

mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions (Kaplan, 2010: 82). During the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Ethiopia laid claim on the Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa and divided the “Greater Somalia” into five distinct political jurisdictions (Ibrahim, 2010: 283). Decades of civil war resulted in state collapse and weak institutions, providing the ideal environment for terrorism, and especially the rise of radical Islam, in Somalia.

The myth of ‘Somalia’

One might assume that the Somalis possess an excellent basis for a cohesive polity, given the fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language and religion, but in reality Somalis are divided by territorial borders and clan affiliations – the most important component of their identity (Kaplan, 2010: 82). The unification of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland following independence on 1 July 1960 to form the Republic of Somalia, still excluded Somali brethren from neighbouring territories – in what is today Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya (Hesse, 2010: 247). Somalia’s current strife began in 1969 when Muhammad Siad Barre led the army to overthrow the elected government of recently assassinated president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in a coup d’état (Linke and Raleigh, 2011: 47). Somalia has been characterised by bouts of civil and international war since then, resulting in profound instability that still persists today.

Somalia’s political and economic development stagnated under the authoritarian socialist regime of Muhammad Siad Barre, characterised by persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents, with the president inordinately favouring members of his own *Darod* clan-family over others (Ibrahim, 2010: 283). Barre’s unsuccessful attempt to conquer Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited region, the Ogaden, in 1977 led to a national crisis, which eventually contributed to internal dissent and civil war. Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991 and the country fell further into a state of disarray and violent clan-militia warfare.

The Somali population – some thirteen to fourteen million, including Somalis living in neighbouring states (*CIA World Factbook*, 2013) – is divided into four major clans and a number of minority groups (Kaplan, 2010: 82). Similar to tribal societies elsewhere in the Middle East, the clans use deeply ingrained customary law to independently govern their communities from modern state structures. There have been over a dozen Somali national reconciliation peace agreement attempts over the last two decades to reconstitute the state that existed when Barre came to power, but these agreements persistently fail due to clan rivalries and misrepresentation of all the clans in talks. From 1996-1997, for example, the Sodere Conference in Ethiopia introduced the “4.5 formula” – a clever formula designed to enable fair power-sharing among the large Somali clan-families – however, it was regarded as a discriminatory and controversial policy at the cost of the smaller clans and minorities (the 0.5) and was later seen to create more problems among the Somalis than it solved (Ibrahim, 2010: 284).

In December 2008, the International Crisis Group (2008) reported that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated into one of the world’s worst humanitarian and security crises. Somalia generates the world’s third highest number of refugees (following Afghanistan and Iraq), and in February 2013, there were 1.25 million Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa region, mainly hosted in Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Tanzania, with almost 1.36 million Somalis internally displaced, settled mainly in the South-Central region (*Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, February 2013).

The rise of radical Islam in Somalia

Since the events of 9/11, Somalia has become the subject of renewed attention from the US and Europe, and the threat that Somalia poses as an archetype of a failed state – the lack of a central government, its violent factional politics, and the presence of Islamic extremist groups – has been equated to that which the US faced in Afghanistan (Holzer, 2008: 23). The history of Islam in the Horn of Africa dates back nearly 1400 years, when it reached the region from the Arabian Peninsula through trade and migration, mainly from Yemen and Oman. A large-scale conversion to Islam

was taking place in Somalia by 1400 AD, first spread by the *Dir* clan-family, but followed by the rest of the nation. Closely linked to the genealogical myths that buttress their clan identity, most Somalis practice a Shafi'i version of the faith, characterised by the veneration of saints (including the ancestors of many Somali clans) and has traditionally been dominated by apolitical Sufi orders (*International Crisis Group*, 2005).

Although some Sufi orders were actively involved in anti-colonial resistance, the emergence of a modern political Islamic consciousness began to gather momentum in the 1960s, with the formation of the *Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami* and the *Jama'at al-Ahl al-Islaami*, both inspired by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood that sought to apply Islamic principles in the context of a newly independent, modernising Somali state (*International Crisis Group*, 2005). It has been argued that the newfound political Islamic consciousness did not lie so much in the change of the dynamics of local politics, but rather in the change of Somalia's international engagement (Holzer, 2008: 25). Somalia became a member of the Arab League in 1974 to obtain access to international aid and diplomatic support in their effort to claim the Ethiopian Somali region, the Ogaden, back. The promulgation of new, controversial family legislation in 1975 by the Barre regime aggravated the religious leaders, and forced many of the organisations to operate underground. In the years that followed, some Somali exiles became closely aligned with the Association of Muslim Brothers (*Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimiin*), adopting its emphasis on political action. Others were exposed to more conservative Salafi ideas and the militant undercurrents associated with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. The Somali government had inadvertently given a crucial boost to the burgeoning – albeit largely extra-territorial – Somali Islamist movement (Holzer, 2008: 1).

Small circles of Islamic study groups and Muslim Brotherhood cells were active in Somalia by the late 1980s, especially in Mogadishu, and as elsewhere in the Islamic world, these groups were largely composed of educated young men (Menkhaus, 2002: 112). During the early years of state collapse and civil war, these groups attempted and mostly failed to take direct control of territories. The most visible and radical group during this period was the *al-Ittihad al-Islaami* (the Islamic Union) group, which is based on the *Wahhabist* sect and an offspring of the Muslim Brother-

hood (Holzer, 2008: 27). Al-Ittihad is distinguished from the other organisations because of its organisational discipline and its strategy of taking power by violence. Al-Ittihad's failed attempts to maintain direct control of territories taught them two key lessons: holding major towns made them fixed targets for powerful external adversaries (principally Ethiopia), and holding fixed territories invariably meant controlling one clan's land or town, which resulted in the organisation being viewed as an occupying force or outsider (Menkhaus, 2002: 114).

Al-Ittihad adopted several tactics as a result, which defined most of their activities in the late 1990s (Menkhaus, 2002: 114-116). First, they concluded that clannish Somalia was not yet ready for Islamic rule and opted for a long-term strategy to educate the Somali society, with an emphasis on Islamic education. Second, to avoid being targeted, al-Ittihad members chose to integrate themselves with the local Somali communities. Third, where they have maintained a fixed physical space, al-Ittihad cells tended to be in strategically placed, but very isolated rural areas. Fourth, to build up a power base, they have tended to move into commerce and sought to recruit businessmen into their cells. Finally, and arguably the most important strategy, al-Ittihad adopted what can loosely be called the "Turabi" strategy, where instead of making an outright bid for control over local administrations, they rather sought to obtain control over key parts of administrations (such as the judiciary with Shari'a Law) while a secular authority presided over the administration as a whole. Ideally, they hoped to achieve what Hassan al Turabi succeeded in doing for a time in Sudan: gradually phasing a civilian government out and indirectly controlling politics without ever claiming direct control of the administration (Menkhaus, 2002: 116). A common characteristic of militant organisations in Somalia is the extent to which their ideological roots and financial backing lie outside Somalia (Bryden, 2003: 27).

The evolution of al Shabab

The US, Somalia's neighbours and even some Somalis have expressed concern over the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia (Dagne, 2010: 4). The government coup in 1991 left a political vacuum, and after fifteen years of chaos – a period characterised by the outbreak

of civil war between the tribal warlords – a fundamentalist Islamic group emerged in early 2006, gaining unprecedented support from many citizens (Simpson, 2009: 33). The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), formerly a loose confederation of regional judiciary systems, defeated the ruling CIA-backed warlords that controlled Mogadishu in June 2006, becoming more politically powerful and relevant than the rival Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Baidoa (Shank, 2007). For many Somalis, the UIC appeared to be the long-sought solution to years of state collapse, reason enough to support the Islamists (Menkhaus, 2007: 371). Although the UIC did not enjoy any form of democratic legitimacy, the UIC nevertheless provided a higher level of security and a modest economic upsurge (Kasajja, 2010: 265).

The leadership of al-Ittihad, including Sheik Ali Warsame, the brother in law of the former leader of Hizbul Islam, Sheik Hassan Aweys, met in 2003 and decided to form a new political front (Dagne, 2010: 5). The young members of al-Ittihad, some of whom had fought in Afghanistan, disagreed with many of the decisions of the older members and decided to form their own movement – *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedeen* – while based in a town in northern Somalia, Las Anod. Although al Shabab was not active and did not control any territory until 2007-2008, the primary objective of this group was irredentism and to establish the “Greater Somalia” under Shari’a Law. The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 led to the disintegration of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) system, and while the UIC leadership moved to Eritrea, al Shabab’s secretive leadership slowly took control over the resistance movement (Dagne, 2010: 5). After being exiled, the UIC split into two separate factions – the Alliance for the Re-liberalisation of Somalia (ARS) and al Shabab. Many Somalis joined the fight against Ethiopian occupation.

The leaders of al Shabab are not well known, save a few exceptions. The principle leaders of al Shabab, the former military wing of the UIC, during its emergence were Aden Hashi Ayro, killed in 2008 during an US missile strike on his home in Dusamareb, and Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed Godane (Shinn, 2011: 207). Ayro trained in Afghanistan with al Qaeda during the late 1990s, and Godane fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan until the end of 2001, and both principle leaders thus put a chain of com-

mand patterned after the one used by al Qaeda into place in the structure of al Shabab. Some of the key commanders and leadership members of al Shabab come from Somaliland – the semi-autonomous area in the north-west of Somalia (Dagne, 2010: 6). Al Shabab is structured in three different layers: the top leadership (qiyadah), the foreign fighters (muhajirin), and local Somali fighters (ansar) (Shinn, 2011: 209). Counting or even defining foreign fighters is almost an impossible task, but three kinds of foreign fighters have been identified: Somalis who were born across the borders in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, and have the nationalities of those countries; Somalis who, or whose parents, were born in Somalia but who have grown up in diasporas and carry a foreign passport; and fighters who have no ethnic Somali connection (Shinn, 2011: 210).

Foreign involvement in al Shabab takes on two forms: the transfer of strategy, tactics and ideology learned by Somali al Shabab leaders during their association with the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the recruitment of foreign fighters (Shinn, 2011: 207). Public statements by both organisations have unavoidably moved al Shabab and al Qaeda closer to each other. The strategic significance of al Shabab to the US was raised in 2008, when the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated al Shabab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (*Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism*, March 18, 2008). Al Shabab only formally joined the ranks of al Qaeda in February 2012, where the *emir* (leader) of al Shabab, Godane, proclaimed that he “pledged obedience” to al Qaeda head, Ayman al Zawahiri, in a joint video (*Al Jazeera*, February 10, 2012).

The election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, an Islamist leader, as the president of an expanded TFG on 31 January 2009 resulted in dramatic changes in the political landscape of Somalia, triggering a series of shock waves that shook al Shabab to the core (*International Crisis Group*, 2010: 6). The government shortly thereafter declared its commitment to codify and implement Shari’a, and discreet negotiations behind the scenes posed a danger to support for al Shabab as leaders were asked to abandon the armed struggle and to join the government. Godane (also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair) and his foreign jihadi allies conducted a discreet purge of al Shabab in late 2008, and replaced dozens of middle-ranking

and low-level commanders and local administrators deemed ideologically too soft.

Apart from frequent suicide attacks carried out by al Shabab in Mogadishu and elsewhere, al Shabab carried out the twin suicide bombings in Uganda's capital, Kampala, which killed 76 people watching the 2010 football World Cup final, in response to Uganda's involvement in contributing – along with Burundi – the bulk of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), deployed in February 2007 (*BBC News*, October 5, 2012). Eritrea is al Shabab's only regional ally, supporting the organisation to counter the influence of Ethiopia, its bitter enemy. Al Shabab is estimated to have between 7000 and 9000 active fighters. The paper now moves on to the evaluation section.

Evaluation

Civil war and state collapse have rendered Somalia especially vulnerable to external influences, some which have assisted radical groups, such as al Shabab, to flourish, often part of a broader international network. It is the combination of statelessness, insecurity and foreign sponsorship that have been identified as the root causes that produced Somali terrorist behaviour. This section will provide the reader with a discussion on the effectiveness of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, proposed in the theoretical orientation section of the paper, pertaining to some successes achieved in Somalia against al Shabab.

A Somali epic: Central governance, part 15, version 4.5

With an eye towards accommodating Somalia's complex ideological, historical, social, political and economic concerns, the fifteenth attempt since 1991 to restore central governance in Somalia saw the birth of the TFG, the product of protracted negotiations rather than elections, in 2004 in hotel conference rooms in neighbouring Kenya (Hesse, 2010: 252). Reflecting the influences of the clan-based society of Somalia, the TFG adopted the "4.5 formula," evenly dividing representation in parliament amongst the four main clan-families – the *Darod*, *Haawiye*, *Dir* and *Digle-Marifle* – plus five minority constituencies. In total, the TFG's parliament

consists of 550 members, having grown from an original 275 members. From its founding in 2004 until June 2005, the TFG had to meet in neighbouring Kenya out of security fears. From June 2005 until February 2006, the parliament did not convene, and convened again finally on Somali soil in the western city of Baidoa from February 2006 (Hesse, 2010: 253).

The election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, the former head of the deposed UIC, as the new president of an expanded TFG on 31 January 2009 resulted in dramatic changes in the political landscape of Somalia, triggering a series of shock waves that shook al Shabab to the core (*International Crisis Group*, 2010: 6). In March 2009, the TFG adopted a Somali version of Shari'a, challenging the legitimacy of al Shabab as the preferred vessel to Islamise Somalia. The International Crisis Group (2011), however, argued in February 2011 that relatively stable regions in the north of Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) refused to recognise the authority of the TFG, while most of central and southern Somalia remained under the control of al Shabab. Despite substantial financial assistance and much other help, the TFG remained a caricature of a government, unable to deal with humanitarian catastrophe and protect its citizens from al Shabab and other violent groups, and confined to Mogadishu. Hassan Sheik Mohamud, former academic and activist, defeated ex-President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed in September 2012, to become the newly elected President of Somalia by a new TFG parliament (*BBC News*, October 5, 2012).

Successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia

AMISOM has been active in Somalia since March 2007, following the formal authorization of the Mission by the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2007 (*S/RES/1744*, 2007), and is mainly made up of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya. AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) (*AMISOM Background*, Online), and is mandated to “conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities” (*AMISOM Mandate*, Online). It is tasked to:

- Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders.
- Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions.
- Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.
- Monitor the security situation in areas of operation.
- Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

AMISOM has grown and become better resourced over the last couple of years, with the international community appearing willing to increase support, because it regards AMISOM as the last line of containment against al Shabab (*International Crisis Group*, 2011: 17). By 2011, however, it was felt that the training the TFG troops received from AMISOM troops and other international partners was not sufficient, in that the TFG had not been able to capture and hold large insurgent controlled sections of Mogadishu (*International Crisis Group*, 2011: 15). Mainly AMISOM troops, and militias allied to it, prosecuted the war against al Shabab, resulting in the slow expansion of government control. One of the major successes of the Mission was achieved in August 2011 when AMISOM troops together with TFG forces pushed al Shabab fighters out of the capital, Mogadishu (Gettleman and Ibrahim, 2011). Another recent success resulted in al Shabab losing control of its last strategic stronghold on the southern coast of Somalia, Kismayo, in September 2012 (*BBC News*, October 5, 2012). On 7 March 2013, the United Nations Security Council decided to authorise the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 28 February 2014 (*S/RES/2093*, 2013).

A new approach to state-building in Somalia

Seth Kaplan argues that much of the blame for the deepening nightmare in Somalia should be placed on the international community, where its unimaginative approach to state-building misconstrues Somalia's sociopolitical context, showing little understanding of how a top-down approach impacts the state's decentralised clan structures (Kaplan, 2010: 89). Kaplan argues that the international community should work directly with the clans and sub-clans and assist them in establishing a series of regional

governments patterned on those already enjoying a high level of functionality and operation in Somaliland and Puntland. It is argued that these entities, with some international support, could serve almost all of their population's day-to-day needs – from education to health care and policing, and in resolving business and family disputes. A central government should be retained, but its functions strictly limited in scope and its institutions in number (Kaplan, 2010: 90).

After more than two decades of state collapse, Somalia made a number of commendable strides on the political front. In September 2011, a political roadmap was agreed upon by the major Somali constituencies, detailing the delivery of transitional milestones before the expiry of the TFG's mandate (Chitiyo and Rader, 2012). The international responses to the roadmap in the form of the London and Istanbul conferences once again illustrated the international community's increased interest in Somalia. The London Conference on Somalia on February, 23 2012, aimed at achieving a 'Somali consensus' for international cooperation after the transition period ended in August 2012, attracted over 40 heads of states, including representatives from the US, UK, the TFG and Turkey (Chitiyo and Rader, 2012). The inclusive nature of the Istanbul II conference, held from May 31 to June 1, 2012, was highlighted by the high-level representation from 57 countries and 11 international and regional organisations, including the TFG leadership, regional administrations and Somali society consisting of segments of the youth, women, business, elders, religious leaders and Somali diaspora (Chitiyo and Rader, 2012).

The transitional national charter, adopted as part of the Djibouti peace process (2008-2009), mandated a number of requisite tasks, including the drafting of a new constitution, that had to be achieved by the TFG within six years, but by 2011, however, very little progress had been made (Chitiyo and Rader, 2012). The transitional parliament's term, due to expire at the time, was extended by an additional three years, and the TFG's mandate was extended with an additional year to August 2012, with the signing of the Kampala Accords. Although the April 1, 2012 deadline was missed, the new constitution was approved by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) – composed of 825 prominent Somalis – on August 2, 2012 amid failed suicide attacks (Harper, 2012). Hassan Sheik Mohamud,

a teacher and activist, won the presidential election on September 10, 2012 against outgoing president, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, by a legislative vote of 190 to 79 (*The Guardian Online*, September 16, 2012). Although the transitional period and the TFG have officially ended, new president Hassan Sheik Mohamud and the NCA will face many challenges in the continuing Somali peace process, with al Shabab and Somalia's failed state status still persisting.

Conclusion

The explicit aim of the paper was to discuss the post-9/11 strategic challenge of Somalia's al Shabab in the context of histories and spaces of terror in Africa. In the first section, a brief introduction to the research problem was disseminated. It was then established in the historical overview section that the uniqueness and persistence of the four waves of modern terrorism, along with the brief historical contextualisation of global and African terrorism, indicates that terrorism is deeply rooted in modern cultures. It is evident that definitions of terrorism are not fixed and that they change over time according to the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, and the cliché "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" provides little assistance in achieving definitional clarity.

Terrorism as a modern phenomenon was then contextualised in the theoretical orientation section, followed by a discussion on the key aspects of the implications of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the US on the modern terrorism discourses, culminating in counterterrorist strategies proposed for weak states. It is believed that the promotion of democracy and good governance will result in increasing the legitimacy of the ruling power to exercise control over its territory and population by means of regular, multiparty elections, providing the conducive setting for socioeconomic reforms (i.e. the alleviation of extreme poverty), which in turn will result in the building of state capacity and institutions (aimed at combating terrorism) through the training and rebuilding of the security forces to wield authoritative force.

In the following section, the post-9/11 strategic challenge of Somalia's al Shabab was discussed. Decades of civil war resulted in state col-

lapse and weak institutions, providing the ideal environment for terrorism, and especially the rise of radical Islam, in Somalia. Although some Sufi orders were actively involved in anti-colonial resistance, the emergence of a modern political Islamic consciousness began to gather momentum in the 1960s. Even though al Shabab was not active and did not control any territory until 2007-2008, the primary objective of this group was irredentism and to establish the “Greater Somalia” under Shari’a Law. Civil war and state collapse have rendered Somalia especially vulnerable to external influences, some which have assisted radical groups, such as al Shabab, to flourish, often part of a broader international network.

The following section provided the reader with an evaluation of the post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies proposed to counter terrorism in weak and failing states. The adoption of the “4.5 formula,” and the expansion of the TFG in 2009, to include as wide a range of political participants in the expanded government of Somalia, and to promote democracy and the principles of good governance, is a reflection of the challenges facing Somalis and the international community when one considers Somalia’s complex ideological, historical, social, political and economic concerns. For decades, the hapless citizens of Somalia had to bear the scars of both state failure and an Islamist dictatorship. With Mogadishu and other towns now under the control of the NCA, there is a new feeling of hope in the country, with many Somalis returning from exile, bringing their money and skills with them (*BBC News*, October 5, 2012). Somalia reflects the positive side of counter-terrorism where domestic political will, regional support in the form of AMISOM and international assistance seen in the like of the London Conference all coalesce to eradicate the scourge of terrorism on this blighted continent of Africa. It is a lesson which needs to be examined by those attempting to respond to Islamists in both Mali and Nigeria.

If Mogadishu could now provide effective services to its citizens, its legitimacy would be enhanced amongst ordinary citizens. This, in turn, would further undermine the Islamist extremists. The international community needs to effectively and critically engage with the Somali government institutions as it seeks to build state capacity towards this end.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, E., 1998. *Terrorism: Theirs and Ours*. Paper presented at the University of Colorado, Boulder (October 12, 1998). <http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Al Jazeera*, 10 February 2012. Al Shabab “Joins Ranks” With Al Qaeda. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/201221054649118317.html> Retrieved 21 August 2012.
- AMISOM, 2013. AMISOM Background. <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- AMISOM, 2013. AMISOM Mandate. <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Ayinde, O.A., 2010. Beyond 9/11: Histories and Spaces of Terrorism in Africa. In Smith, M.S. (ed). *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 51-66.
- Bobbit, P., 2006. The Terrorist War on the Market-State: A Plague in a Time of Feast. In Katona, P., Intriligator, M.D. and Sullivan, J.P. (eds). *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 218-234.
- Bobbit, P., 2008. *Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 5 October 2012. Q&A: Who are Somalia’s Al Shabaab? <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Bryden, M., 2003. No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms With Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia. *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Fall (2003): pp. 24-56.
- Chitiyo, K and Rader, A., 2012. *Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?*. The Brenthurst Foundation
- Discussion Paper 4. http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/brenthurst_commissioned_reports/Brenthurst-paper-201204-Somalia-2012-Ending-the-Transition.pdf. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
- CIA World Factbook, 2013. Somalia. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Combs, C.C., 2006. *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Dagne, T., 2010. *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, Congressional Research Services Report prepared for Congress, RL33911 (October 2010).
- Freedman, L., 2002. (ed). *Superterrorism: Policy Responses*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Gearson, J., 2002. The Nature of Modern Terrorism. In Freedman, L. (ed).

- Superterrorism: Policy Responses*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 7-24.
- Gettleman, J. and Ibrahim, M., 2011. Shabab Concede Control of Capital to Somalia Government. *New York Times* (August 6, 2011).
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/world/africa/07somalia.html?_r=2. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Guardian Online*, 16 September, 2012. Somalia's New President Officially Takes Power After Assassination Attempt. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/16/somalia-president-power-assassination-attempt>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Gupta, D.K., 2008. *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The life cycle of birth, growth, transformation, and demise*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Harper, M., 2012. Somalia: Failed State or Fantasy Land? *BBC News* (August 3, 2012).
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19099442>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Heywood, A., 2007. *Politics*. 3rd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hesse, B.J., 2010. The Myth of 'Somalia'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28(3): pp. 247-259.
- Holzer, G-S., 2008. Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Radical Islamic Groups? *Geopolitics of the Middle East*, 1(1): pp. 23-42.
- Hurwood, B.J., 1970. *Society and the Assassin: A Background Book on Political Murder*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Ibrahim, M., 2010. Somalia and Global Terrorism: A Growing Connection? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28(3): pp. 283-295.
- International Crisis Group, 2005. Somalia's Islamists. *Africa Report No 100* (December 2005).
- International Crisis Group, 2008. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. *Africa Report No 147* (December 2008).
- International Crisis Group, 2010. Somalia's Divided Islamists. Policy Briefing, *Africa Briefing No 74* (May 2010).
- International Crisis Group, 2011. Somalia: The Transitional Federal Government on Life Support. *Africa Report No 170*.
- Jackson, R., 2005. Security, Democracy and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism. *Democracy and Security*, 1 (2005): pp. 147-171.
- Kaplan, S., 2010. Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State. *The Washington Quarterly*, 33(1): pp. 81-97.
- Kasajja, A.P., 2010. The UN-led Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and Problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28(3): pp. 261-282.
- Katona, P., 2006. The Historical Impact of Terrorism, Epidemics and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In Katona, P., Intriligator M.D. and Sullivan, J.P. (eds). *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 13-32.

- Law, R.D., 2009. *Terrorism: A History*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Linke, A. and Raleigh, C., 2011. State and Stateless Violence in Somalia. *African Geographical Review*, 30(1): pp. 47-66.
- Lutz, J.M. and Lutz, B.J., 2004. *Global Terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Mahan, S. and Griset, P.L., 2008. *Terrorism in Perspective*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- McGowan, P.J., Cornelissen, S. and Nel, P., 2010. *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*. 3rd ed. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Menkhaus, K., 2002. Political Islam in Somalia. *Middle East Policy*, 9(1): pp. 109-123.
- Menkhaus, K., 2007. The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts. *African Affairs*, 106(204): pp. 357-390.
- Mills, G., 2004. Africa's New Strategic Significance. *The Washington Quarterly*, 27(4): pp. 157-169.
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002.
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Neumann, P.R., 2009. *Old and New Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*, 2013. Somalia Fact Sheet. <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism*. (Adopted 14 July 1999). Article 1, Section 3(a). http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/EAU_CONVENTION_PREVENTION_COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Pham, J.P., 2007. Next Front? Evolving United States-African Strategic Relations in the "War on Terrorism" and Beyond. *Comparative Strategy*, 26 (2007): pp. 39-54.
- Rapoport, D.C., 2002. The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. *Anthropoetics*, 8(1).
- Rice, C., 2008. Designation of al-Shabab. *Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* (March 18, 2008). <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143205.htm>. Retrieved on 8 February 2013.
- Rice, S., 2001. *Testimony before the US House Committee on International Relations* (November 2001).
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa76191.000/hfa76191_0f.htm. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Robespierre, M., 1794. "On the Moral and Political Principles of Domestic Policy". *Justification of the Use of Terror*. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.asp>. Retrieved 8 February 2013.
- Shank, M., 2007. Understanding Political Islam in Somalia. *Contemporary Islam*.
- Shaw, T.M., 2008. From Terrorism to Human Security in Africa. In Christopher

- Ankerson, C. (ed). *Understanding Global Terror*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 130-150.
- Sheehan, M., 2008. The Changing Character of War. In Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (eds). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 210-225.
- Shinn, D., 2011. Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia. *Orbis*, Spring (2011): pp. 203- 215.
- Simpson, M., 2010. An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia. *Geopolitics of the Middle East*, 2(1): pp. 31-49.
- Smith, M.S., 2010. Terrorism Thinking: "9/11 Changed Everything". In Smith, M.S. (ed). *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 1-30.
- United Nations Security Council*, 2007. Resolution 1744 (S/RES/1744). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1744. Retrieved 8 February 2013.
- United Nations Security Council*, 2013. Resolution 2093 (S/RES/2093). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2093. Retrieved 8 February 2013.
- United States Department of State, 2002. *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (May 2002). <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10286.pdf>. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
- Walls, M., 2009. The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland. *African Affairs*, 108(432): pp. 371-389.
- Whitaker, B.E., 2008. Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya. *International Studies Perspectives*, 9: pp. 254-271.
- Whittaker, D.J., 2012. *The Terrorism Reader*. 4th ed. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Wilkinson, P., 2001. Politics, Diplomacy and Peace Processes: Pathways out of Terrorism? In Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (eds). *The Future of Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 66-82.